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Abstract
Labelling is an increasingly popular way to deal with the problem of
non-observability of quality inherent in the consumption of credence
goods. I present a model in which the number of labelled products a
monopolist offers serves as a signal for the non-observable endogenous
quality. An increase in the number of labelled products increases the
risk of losing consumer trust by increasing the possibility of detecting
wrong labels. This lowers the incentive to produce low quality in the
first place.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that asymmetric information may cause serious market inef-
ficiencies. In this context, credence goods present a special kind of problem:
even after consumption the product’s quality cannot be determined by the
consumers. Many product attributes for which consumers are willing to pay
a premium relative to the normal price have credence quality. To illustrate,
consumers may care that the breakfast cereal was really produced organically,
that food doesn’t contain genetic modified organisms (GMO), that tuna was
fished dolphin-friendly etc. Usually, the production of this kind of high qual-
ity goods is more costly than that of low quality ones. But if this is the
case, consumers may doubt the quality specification given by the firm, since
there’s an evident incentive for the firm to produce low quality goods and
sell them at high prices. This means, consumers may not be willing to pay
the full premium, leading to lower profits for firms producing high quality
goods, thereby lowering their incentive to invest in high quality which further
increases consumers’ doubts. In the end, this may lead to a non-provision of
high quality goods although many people prefer consuming high quality and
paying a premium. Thus, we may end up with an inefficient market outcome.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to circumvent this inefficient sit-
uation. Emons [1997 and 2001] analyzes the case where a customer does
not know whether she really received the expert’s service she was in need
of. He shows that under certain conditions the expert provides honest ser-
vices. A survey of credence goods and expert services is given by Dulleck
and Kerschbamer [2001].
Shapiro [1982 and 1983] analyzes repeated buying of experience goods.
He argues that expected higher future profits, called return to reputation,
prevent firms from offering low quality at a premium price. Since product
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quality is not observable even after consumption, this mechanism doesn’t
apply with credence goods. A fast growing number of labelled goods, see for
example Thøgersen [2000], indicates another way to try to convince potential
customers of a firm’s products’ qualities. Golan, Kuchler and Mitchell [2001]
discuss effects of food labelling and present some case studies and examples.
By labelling whole product lines a firm may benefit from consumers’ positive
experience with other products bearing the same label.1 However, the firm
also bears the risk that if one labelled product was found bad, consumers
probably extend this negative experience to other products of the same line.
This is the underlying idea in the articles of Wernerfelt [1988], Choi [1998]
and Cabral [2000] about extending brands to new products. However, all the
results are derived for the case of experience goods where the product’s qual-
ity is observed after consumption. In addition, product quality is exogenous
while in the underlying paper it will be the producer’s choice.
In the following we shall see that although consumers cannot directly observe
product quality, they may rely on the number of labelled products in a firm’s
product line as a signal for the possible loss in reputation that could occur
if the firm tries to sell low quality credence goods at a premium price. This
latter case does not have to mean malicious behavior by the firm but also
includes carelessness in production, e.g. possible measurement errors con-
cerning GMO2, and will be modelled as non-willingness to invest a certain
amount in the production process.
The model is based on the idea that consumers mainly trust or mistrust firms
1If someone, for example, made good experiences with organically produced tea, she
may choose to buy also coffee with the same label.
2In a recent case in Switzerland it was discovered that the fodder for animals within a
meat-label-programme contained 17% GMO which was way above the allowed 3%. The
reason was a measurement error indicating a GMO-share of only 1.7%.
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or their labels rather than single products. So, if they lose faith in some
labelled good, they will also doubt the quality of all other products with
the same label. Empirical evidence supports the assumption that consumers
extend bad news about a product’s quality to other products with the same
brand. For example, Sullivan [1990] shows that the 1986 sudden-acceleration
incident with the Audi 5000 caused negative price effects for the Audi 4000
and the Audi Quattro as well.
We assume that after the production process but before the consumers’ buy-
ing decision there is the possibility of detecting low quality goods in a firm’s
product line, be it through tests performed by a consumer protection or-
ganization, an employee publishing insider information, or otherwise. This
will lead the firm to trade off higher profits by selling low quality at a high
price thereby increasing the risk of losing the premiums on all labelled goods
against lower but safer profits.
2 The Model
A monopolist facing homogeneous consumers can offer credence goods of
either high or low quality. Given their preferences the consumers are willing
to pay a premiumH > 0 for a high quality credence good and no premium for
the low quality one. Before production takes place the firm decides whether
it wants to invest an amount c ≥ 0 per product type, like beer, wheat bread,
blue T-shirts etc., in order to produce high quality or not. These costs
may represent higher production costs, costly tests performed by the firm,
monitoring costs etc. We assume c to be the realization of a random variable
c˜ which is distributed with density ψ(·) on [0, c¯]. This distribution is known
to both the monopolist and the consumers. The cost c per product type,
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necessary to produce high quality, is exogenous and the firm only decides
whether to invest or not. Thus, c can be interpreted as an efficiency measure
of a firm’s production process.
Since the quality of a product is not directly observable by the consumer,
the firm can put a label on a good, indicating high product quality, even if
this is not true. It can thus try to get the premium without having to invest
c. We will call such a label a “bad label”, whereas a label on a high quality
product is called a “good label”.
In the following we will concentrate our analysis on the part of a firm’s prod-
ucts that do bear a label. Let the firm’s product line consist of n different
products, all of which bear a label. We will consider a short run situation
meaning that the number of products is fixed at n, e.g., by capacity con-
straints, market potential etc. The monopolist is free to choose the quality
of each product type independently of the other types, i.e., for how many
product types he wants to invest c.3 The firm’s choice variable therefore is
the number of good labels among those n labelled products. It will be mod-
elled as the firm choosing the fraction s ∈ [0, 1] of good labels relative to n,
the total number of labelled products.
After the production process, but before consumers buy the good, there is
the possibility that bad labels are detected through testing, information leaks
etc.
3For example, a firm might choose to offer high quality coffee but low quality potato
chips where “quality” is always referring to the credence attribute.
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For each bad label there is a probability q, where 0 < q < 1, of being
detected.4
Note that we want to exclude errors in the detection process. In particular,
it is not possible that a good label is found bad. Both the firm and the
consumers are informed whether there was detection of any bad labels or
not. After this, the monopolist sets the price for his products. We normalize
the units of the different products such that the price, resp. the premium
H that consumers are willing to pay for a high quality good, is the same for
each product group. Finally, consumers decide whether to buy the products
or not. To keep matters simple we assume that firms produce only one unit
of each product type, i.e., n different labelled products altogether.5 Both the
firm and the consumers are risk-neutral. Further on we assume that c¯ < H.6
2.1 Firm’s Cost is Known to Consumers
Let us first consider the case in which the premium H, the detection proba-
bility q and the production costs c are known to both monopolist and con-
sumers.
The sequence of events is as follows:
Stage 1: The monopolist decides upon the fraction of good labels relative
4If q = 0 no bad label is ever detected. The firm has no incentive to invest in good
labels and - knowing this - consumers would not pay any premium. Otherwise, if q = 1
every bad label would be detected but then we do not face a credence good problem, a
case we want to exclude.
5Instead of doing so, we could also regard H as the total revenue from a whole product
group.
6This condition implies that even if the firm is of the least efficient type, there is a
surplus from producing high quality.
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to the total number of labelled products, i.e., he chooses s.
Stage 2: Nature chooses whether there is detection of fraud or not, i.e.,
if at least one product with a bad label has been found. Consumers observe if
there have been detected any bad labels or not and form their beliefs about
the quality of the products. Let µ be the probability they assign to the
product being of high quality.
Stage 3: The monopolist sets a price P as a function of H, q, n, c, and
µ per unit of product.
Stage 4: The consumers will buy the products or not. We assume that
consumers will buy the products if they are indifferent.
Risk neutral consumers are willing to pay a price P (·) for each labelled good,
where P (·) = µH + (1− µ)0, with µ representing the probability consumers
assign to a labelled product being of high quality.
The assumption that consumers trust or distrust a firm as a whole, resp. its
labels, rather than single products, is modelled as the consumers reducing
the price they are willing to pay for all labelled goods, if there have been any
bad labels.
We will say that if consumers observe that at least one bad label has
been detected, they reduce the price they are willing to pay for each labelled
product by some amount k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ P (·). The price reduction k
is endogenous and depends on the beliefs that consumers have about being
offered high quality. In equilibrium the price reduction k by a rational con-
sumer is either 0 - if no bad label was detected and the number of labelled
products reaches a certain value - or P (·) if at least one bad label was de-
tected. Consumers know that if there has been no detection of fraud, this
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could be either because all labels are good or because, by chance, none of
the bad ones was detected. Accordingly, they are willing to pay a price P (·)
based an all the information they have.
Within the given framework there is a probability of (1 − q)n(1−s) that no
bad label is detected and the firm receives the price P (·) for each product it
sells. With a probability of 1− (1− q)n(1−s) at least one bad label is detected
and the firm only gets P (·)− k per unit of the product. The firm maximizes
expected profits
pie = (1− q)n(1−s)nP (·) + (1− (1− q)n(1−s))n[P (·)− k]− nsc (1)
by choosing s for a given n. We shall see that consumers are able to derive a
threshold value for n which we call n, below which the firm will produce only
low quality products. So, if consumers observe that the number of labelled
products is smaller than n, they will pay no premium for any good, even
if there was no detection of any bad label. Therefore, equation (1) is only
valid for a firm having n ≥ n, otherwise it will only produce low quality and
receive a price of 0 for them.
If
∂pie
∂s
= −(1− q)n(1−s)n2 ln(1− q)k − nc > 0,
expected profits are increasing in s and therefore in the number of good labels
for a given number of labelled products.
The last inequality can be rewritten as
−(1− q)n(1−s) ln(1− q)nk > c. (2)
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Condition (2) tells us that in order to invest c in one more product given n,
thereby reducing the number of bad labels by one, marginal costs of doing
so, c, have to be smaller than marginal benefits. These benefits consist of
the reduction in the risk of detection over the whole product line, −n(1 −
q)n(1−s) ln(1 − q), times the additional price the firm can get for a labelled
product by avoiding the consumers’ ”punishment” k.
Note that given n, expected profits are convex7 in s since
∂2pie
∂s2
= n3k(ln(1− q))2(1− q)n(1−s) > 0.
Therefore the optimal choice of s is either 0 or 1, i.e., the firm will either
choose to have only bad or only good labels in its product line but no mixture
of both. Accordingly, if the firm decides to bear the costs to produce high
quality goods it will not risk the premia by also offering bad labelled products.
On the other hand, if premia are low relative to costs and the detection
probability is not too high, it will decide not to invest at all rather than just
investing in a few high quality goods.
Given this binary choice, the firm just compares expected profits if it has
only good labels with the case where it has only bad ones. The firm chooses
to offer only high quality goods, i.e., s∗ = 1, if
nP (·)− nc ≥ (1− q)nnk + nP (·)− nk
or if
(1− (1− q)n)k ≥ c. (3)
7Strictly convex if k > 0.
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Since all the parameters in condition (3) are known to the consumers, they
are able to derive the monopolist’s optimal s, being 0 or 1. Hence, they are
able to derive the true quality of the labelled goods and choose to pay the
corresponding price. Therefore, either µ? = 1 and P (·) = H for high quality,
or µ? = 0, resp. P (·) = 0, for low quality products.
We see from condition (3) that for any q ∈ (0, 1) there exists a certain number
of labelled goods n such that the firm prefers s = 1 to s = 0 ∀ n ≥ n. This
shows that if the firm has a critical size, measured by the number of labelled
products, it will behave honestly, meaning that it will not offer any bad
labelled products.
Consumers know that the monopolist offers either only high or only low
quality products. Accordingly, they will refuse to pay any premium at all
if at least one bad label was detected, i.e., k = P (·). If condition (3) is
satisfied for k = P (·), consumers know that all products are of high quality.
Considering that in this case they are willing to pay P (·) = H and inserting
this into condition (3), the critical n can then easily be derived, since at n it
is true that
(1− (1− q)n)H = c.
This leads to
n =
ln(1−
c
H
)
ln(1− q)
. (4)
Note that c/H is smaller than one, given c¯ < H.
Let us check how changes in the parameter values affect this threshold value n.
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(i) Changes in costs:
∂n
∂c
= −
1
ln(1− q)(H − c)
> 0
since H > c. The higher the firm’s cost, the larger is the threshold value n. If
costs to produce high quality are increasing, there is an increasing incentive
to produce low quality under a bad label. Thus, the threshold value n has
to be larger, such that the higher risk to lose all the premia under bad labels
offsets the incentive to produce low quality.
(ii) Changes in the achievable premium:
∂n
∂H
=
c
ln(1− q)H(H − c)
< 0
since H > c. The higher the premium consumers are willing to pay for a
high quality good, the higher is the firm’s incentive not to risk those premia
by offering bad labels. Therefore, the number of labelled products can be
smaller to guarantee high quality production.
(iii) Changes in the detection probability:
∂n
∂q
=
ln(1− c/H)
(ln(1− q))2(1− q)
< 0.
The higher the probability of detection, the higher the risk to lose all the
premia by offering bad labels. Therefore, with an increasing detection prob-
ability q, the threshold value n can be lower to still guarantee high quality
production.
The above considerations are summarized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 If c is known to the consumers, then there is a threshold value
n for the number of labelled products above which consumers can be sure of
getting high quality products. This threshold value increases with a firm’s
cost c, and decreases with the premium H and the detection probability q.
Proposition 1 summarizes the equilibrium obtained in this section.
Proposition 1 Given the above defined consumer behavior and the fact that
all the relevant parameters are known to the consumers, we find the following
Bayesian equilibrium:
· if consumers observe that n < n as defined in equation (4), they expect
only low quality products (µ? = 0) and don’t pay any premium even if there
is no detection of a bad label. A monopolist with n < n will decide not to
produce any high quality products and sets the price P (·) = 0.
· if consumers observe n ≥ n and no detection of a bad label, they expect
only high quality products (µ? = 1) and pay the full premium H per unit of
the good. A monopolist with n ≥ n will decide to produce only high quality
products and sets the price P (·) = H.
· if consumers observe the detection of at least one bad label, they expect
only low quality products and don’t pay any premium. A monopolist who
suffered the detection of a bad label will set the price P (·) = 0.
Therefore, the number of labelled products is a signal for the quality of
the firm’s products.
2.2 Firm’s Cost is Unknown to Consumers
In general, consumers do not know a firm’s production process. Therefore,
let us now consider the situation where consumers observe the parameters q,
H, and n, but not c. Again, before deciding whether to buy the good or not,
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consumers learn if any bad labels were detected, although they do not know
the exact number, resp. fraction of bad labels detected.
The sequence of events is as follows:
Stage 1: The monopolist learns his cost c and chooses the fraction s of
good labels relative to the total number of labelled goods.
Stage 2: Nature chooses whether there is detection of fraud or not, i.e.,
if at least one product with a bad label has been found. Consumers observe if
any bad labels were detected or not and form their beliefs about the quality
of the products. Let µ be the probability they assign to the product being
of high quality.
Stage 3: The monopolist sets a price P as a function of H, q, n, c, and
µ per unit of product.
Stage 4: The consumers will buy the products or not. We assume that
consumers will buy the products if they are indifferent.
We still model consumer behavior such that they reduce the price they are
willing to pay by some amount k if any bad labels have been detected or
they pay a price P = µH + (1 − µ)0 per unit if no detection occurred.
The difference to the previous section is that now µ is not a function of c.
Given consumer behavior, the monopolist’s expected profit is again given by
equation (1), i.e.,
pie = (1− q)n(1−s)nP (·) + (1− (1− q)n(1−s))n[P (·)− k]− nsc. (5)
Given this, the conclusions about the shape of expected profits made in the
last section remain true. Most important is the fact that expected profits are
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still convex with respect to s, which leads the monopolist to a binary choice
between s = 0 and s = 1. Accordingly, if consumers observe the detection
of at least one bad label they will refuse to pay any premium on all the
labelled goods, i.e., k = P (·). Knowing the distribution of c, the consumers
can derive the probability that the monopolist will choose s = 1. Let us call
this probability, i.e., the probability that all the labels are good, ρ(·).
The game in extensive form is represented in figure 1.
[Insert figure 1 about here]
Consumers know that
· if any bad label is detected, i.e., the game reaches point C, then all labels
must be bad. This happens with an ex-ante probability of (1−ρ(·))(1− (1−
q)n),
· if there is no detection, then it is either because there are only good
labels or because there are only bad labels but by chance none was detected.
These two possibilities form an information set which is reached with an
ex-ante probability of ρ(·) + (1− q)n(1− ρ(·)).
In the first case, i.e., if any bad labels are detected, the consumers will not
pay any premium and the monopolist sets the price P (·) = 0.
In the second case, i.e., if there is no detection, consumers will update their
beliefs according to Bayes’ rule.
They assign a probability of
µ? :=
ρ(·)
ρ(·) + (1− ρ(·))(1− q)n
to being in point A, i.e., that all labels are good, and a probability of
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1− µ? :=
(1− ρ(·))(1− q)n
ρ(·) + (1− ρ(·))(1− q)n
to being in point B, i.e., that all labels are bad. Accordingly, they are willing
to pay a price
P (·) = µ?H + (1− µ?)0 (6)
for the product in the case of no detection.
The monopolist’s expected profits are therefore represented by
pie = (1− q)n(1−s)nµ?H − nsc. (7)
Given the firm’s binary choice, it will compare expected profits under s = 1
with those under s = 0. It will choose to produce only high quality goods
(s? = 1) if
nµ?H − nc ≥ (1− q)nnµ?H
or if
µ?H(1− (1− q)n) ≥ c. (8)
From condition (8) we can now derive ρ(·), the probability that only high
quality goods are produced. Define
ρ(·) := Prob(c ≤ µ?H(1− (1− q)n)). (9)
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To get further results, let us assume that c is uniformly distributed between
0 and c¯. For convenience, the left hand term of condition (8) will be called
A in the following.
For ρ(H, q, n, c¯) 6= 0 8 we get9
ρ(H, q, n, c¯) =


H
c¯ −
(1− q)n
(1− (1− q)n)
if 0 < A < c¯
1 if A ≥ c¯
(10)
Accordingly, ρ(H, q, n, c¯) is increasing if the number of labelled products n
increases, meaning that the probability of only high quality goods being
produced is higher the more labelled products the firm has. Returning to
equation (6) we see that in this case the price consumers are willing to pay
is a positive function of the number of labelled products the firm has,10 with
P (q,H, c, n, µ) converging to H as n goes to infinity.
This result is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 In the above defined framework the price consumers are willing to
pay for a labelled credence good is an increasing function of the total number
of labelled products the firm has in its product line.
From equation (10) we can derive a threshold value n1 for which it is true
that ρ(H, q, n, c¯) = 1 ∀ n ≥ n1. Consumers observing a number of labelled
8The event c = 0 occurs with a probability of 0, so removing this single point does not
change the distribution. Therefore, we can concentrate our analysis on ρ(H, q, n, c¯) 6= 0.
9From equation (9) we get
ρ(H, q, n, c¯) =


0 if A = 0
µ?H
c¯ (1− (1− q)
n)) if 0 < A < c¯
1 if A ≥ c¯
10Since µ is an increasing function of n.
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products n ≥ n1, and no detection of bad labels, know that they are being
offered high quality products with a probability ρ(H, q, n, c¯) = 1. We find
n1 =
ln(1− c¯/H)
ln(1− q)
. (11)
The consumers can be sure about getting high quality products, meaning
that ρ(H, q, n, c¯) = 1, only if even the least efficient firm type, i.e., the one
with c = c¯, satisfies condition (8). For any number of labelled products
smaller than the threshold value, consumers have beliefs µ? < 1 that they
get high quality and are willing to pay the corresponding price.
Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium if cost is not observable.
Proposition 2 Given the above defined consumer behavior and that c is
unknown to the consumers, we find the following Bayesian equilibrium:
· if consumers observe n ≥ n1 as defined in equation (11) and no detection
of a bad label, they expect only high quality products (µ? = 1) and pay the
full premium H per unit of the good. A monopolist with n ≥ n1 will decide
to produce only high quality products and sets the price P (H, q, c, n, µ) = H.
· if consumers observe that n < n1 and no detection of a bad label, they
expect being offered high quality with a probability of µ? < 1. Thus, they are
willing to pay a price of µ?H per unit of the good. A monopolist with n < n1
will decide to produce high or low quality products depending on its cost c and
sets the price P (H, q, c, n, µ) = µ?H.
· if consumers observe the detection of at least one bad label, they expect
only low quality products and don’t pay any premium. A monopolist who
suffered the detection of a bad label will set the price P (·) = 0.
Comparing n1 with the threshold value found in equation (4) where con-
sumers know the firm’s cost, we see that n1 ≥ n since
16
ln(1− c¯/H)
ln(1− q)
≥
ln(1− c/H)
ln(1− q)
.
For all but the least efficient firm type the threshold value is larger when
consumers cannot observe c. Thus, the least efficient firm type, i.e., the type
with the highest possible production costs c = c¯, sets the limit above which
consumers completely trust in being offered high quality.
Comparing the situations where c is/is not observable we can distinguish
three cases:
· n ≥ n1 ≥ n: If the firm’s number of labelled products n lies above the
threshold value in both cases, it will produce high quality and set the price
equal to H which consumers are willing to pay if there is no detection. For
those types of firms there is no difference regardless of c being observable or
not.
· n1 > n ≥ n: Such a firm will produce high quality and set price equal
to H if c is observable. If c is not observable it will either produce high or
low quality, depending on its cost,11 and set price equal to µ?H. Those types
of firms that produce high quality in both situations will receive less if c is
not observable. For types of firms producing high quality if c is observable,
but low quality if c is not observable it is ambiguous in which situation they
do better.12
· n1 ≥ n > n: In this case the firm will produce low quality regardless of c
11The condition to produce high quality if c is observable is (1− (1− q)n)H ≥ c. This
being satisfied does not imply that (1− (1− q)n)µ?H ≥ c, the analogous condition if c is
not observable, is also satisfied.
12If cost is known to consumers the firm’s profit is n(H − c) whereas it is nµ?H if c is
unobservable.
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being observable or not.13 This type of firm will benefit from the information
asymmetry with respect to cost, since it will receive 0 for its low quality
products if c is observable but µ?H if c is not observable.
These findings are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Assuming a uniform distribution for the cost c, we find that a firm
with a large number of labelled products will make the same profit whether c is
observable for consumers or not. Efficient types of firms with a medium num-
ber of labelled products tend to do worse, while inefficient types of firms with
a small number of labelled products benefit from the information asymmetry
with respect to c.
3 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a market for labelled credence goods in
which a monopolist faces a number of homogeneous consumers. The monop-
olist decides whether to produce high or low quality goods. This quality is
not directly observable by the consumers but may be found out by means of
watchdog agencies, information leaks etc. Assuming that consumers trust a
firm as a whole, resp. its labels, rather than single products, we designed a
model in which consumers reduce the price they are willing to pay for a la-
belled good if they found out that the firm tried to cheat them by offering low
quality products under a label indicating high quality. Given this consumer
behavior we find that, regardless of c being observable or not, we can derive a
threshold value for the number of labelled products, above which consumers
can be sure of getting high quality. If the number of labelled products is
13Notice that (1− (1− q)n)H < c implies that (1− (1− q)n)µ?H < c.
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below the threshold value and c is not observable, then the consumers derive
the probability of being offered high quality products. This probability, and
therefore the price consumers are willing to pay, is increasing with the num-
ber of labelled products, assuming a uniform distribution of c. The number
of labelled products thus serves as a signal for the quality of the labelled cre-
dence goods. We also saw that firms with a small number of labelled goods
and high costs tend to benefit from the information asymmetry with respect
to cost whereas medium sized firms, measured by the number of goods, with
low costs tend to do worse if c is not observable.
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Figure 1: Game tree if c is unknown to consumers.
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